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1  Introduction 
If traders have different opinions about the value of an asset, optimists will buy and 
pessimists will sell. Short sale restrictions prevent traders not currently owning an asset from 
selling it and thus exclude pessimistic traders from the market. The marginal traders' assess-
ments of the asset value will thus be above average. If the price reflects these optimistic as-
sessments the asset will be overvalued, and the overvaluation will increase in the degree of 
divergence of opinion. This is the overvaluation hypothesis first put forward by Miller (1977). 
Although it is obviously incompatible with a rational expectations equilibrium (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1987) it has received much attention (and a fair amount of empirical support) in the 
literature. A first wave of empirical studies dates from the 1980s and early 1990s. Interest in 
the issue has been re-sparked recently, partially motivated by the question whether short-
selling constraints have contributed to the internet bubble of the late nineties.  
The empirical results, to be summarized briefly in section 2, are inconclusive. Papers 
relating short sale constraints for individual stocks to their valuation or their subsequent return 
on balance find evidence in favor of the overvaluation hypothesis (yet not unanimously). 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) who compare stock returns in countries with and without short 
sale restrictions reject the overvaluation hypothesis. A possible explanation for these contradic-
tory results is the fact that empirical research into the issue is complicated by a number of im-
pediments. Most importantly, neither the value of a stock nor the degree to which it is short 
sale constrained is directly observable. The same applies to the degree of divergence of opin-
ion. Consequently, researchers have to rely on proxies for all variables of interest. These prox-
ies may be noisy or even biased, and they may be correlated with other stock characteristics 
that affect valuation.  
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Our paper contributes to the literature in that it provides the first experimental test of 
the overvaluation hypothesis. None of the problems alluded to above is present in the labora-
tory. The experimenter controls the information structure and, consequently, the degree of di-
vergence of opinion. Similarly, short sale constraints are imposed by the experimenter. As 
identical assets are traded with and without constraints, it is feasible to directly compare the 
market value of the assets, rather than inferring overvaluation from proxy variables or subse-
quent returns.  
Although the impact of short sale constraints on valuation is easily amenable to ex-
perimental research, we know of only three papers that vary the level of short selling con-
straints in the laboratory (King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 2005). 
The design of these experiments differs from ours in a number of important ways. All three 
papers were inspired by experimental results suggesting that bubbles occur frequently in 
experimental markets for long-lived assets (Smith et al. 1988). Against this background they 
test whether allowing short sales has an impact on the frequency and magnitude of bubbles. 
The experiments of King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 2005 feature 
subjects with symmetric information. There is thus no divergence of opinion.
1 Consequently, 
none of these papers can be considered a test of Miller's (1977) overvaluation hypothesis 
because there, divergence of opinion is a necessary condition for overvaluation to occur. 
Further, the degree of divergence of opinion can obviously not be varied in a symmetric 
information setting.  
                                                 
1  There may be differences of opinion due to strategic uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty with respect to the behaviour 
of other subjects. Strategic uncertainty is, however, not under the control of the experimenter.  
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The results of our experiments provide only partial support for the overvaluation hy-
pothesis. Prices in the experimental markets are higher when short selling is prohibited. The 
overvaluation does, however, not depend on the degree of divergence of opinion.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief 
summary of the literature. In section 3 we describe the experimental design and procedures. 
Section 4 presents the hypotheses while the results are contained in section 5. In section 6 we 
summarize our results and offer concluding remarks  
2  Literature 
As noted in the introduction the overvaluation hypothesis was first put forward by 
Miller (1977). If traders in financial markets have different opinions, optimists will buy and 
pessimists will sell. Short sale constraints prevent those pessimists not currently owning the 
asset from selling it. Optimistic opinions will then be overweighted in market prices. Conse-
quently, short sale restrictions lead to overvaluation and the overvaluation is increasing in the 
degree of divergence of opinion.  
The overvaluation hypothesis as put forward by Miller (1977) is inconsistent with a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium.
2 Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) present a rational expecta-
tions model in which short sale constraints do not lead to overvaluation but reduce the speed at 
which new information, and bad information in particular, is incorporated into prices. Similar 
results, though in a very different context, are derived in Hong and Stein (2003). Recent theo-
retical research has revived the overvaluation hypothesis. Duffie et al. (2002) derive a model in 
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which short sale constraints together with divergence of opinion (modeled by assuming differ-
ent priors about the payoff distribution) may lead to overvaluation. In the model of Johnson 
(2004) higher degrees of divergence of opinion lead to lower subsequent returns in a fully ra-
tional context. In Scheinkman and Wei (2003) overconfidence creates divergence of opinion 
and may, in the presence of short sale constraints, lead to overvaluation. A similar result is 
derived in Jiang (2005).  
Researchers have used various avenues in order to empirically test the overvaluation 
hypothesis. The most common approach is to consider a cross-section of stocks and to test 
whether stocks that are subject to short selling constraints are overvalued, and whether over-
valuation depends on the degree of divergence of opinion. This requires (a) identification of 
stocks that are short sale constrained, (b) a measure for the degree of divergence of opinion
3 
and (c) a measure of asset value to identify overvaluation.  
Various measures have been employed to identify short sale constrained stocks. These 
include the short interest (Figlewski and Webb 1993, Asquith and Meulbroek 1996, Dechow et 
al. 2001, Desai et al. 2002, Asquith et al. 2005, Boehme et al. 2005, Cohen et al. 2005), institu-
tional ownership (Asquith et al. 2005, Nagel 2005), the availability of options on the stock 
(Figlewski and Webb 1993, Danielsen and Sorescu 2001, Mayhew and Mihov 2004, Boehme 
et al. 2005), the inclusion of a stock in the "threshold list" (Diether et al. 2005) and the rebate 
rate (Jones and Lamont 2002, Reed 2003, Ofek et al. 2004, Boehme et al. 2005, Cohen et al. 
                                                                                                                                                          
2  It is fair to note that Miller (1977) was well aware of the limitations of his model. He explicitly refers to the 
winner's curse problem and argues (p. 1158) that "many investors are still following naive procedures".  
3  D'Avolio (2002) documents that a stock is more likely to be "on special" (i.e., to be expensive to short) when 
the degree of divergence of opinion is large. This suggests that the two explanatory variables of interest may not 
be independent.  
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2005). The most widespread proxy for the degree of divergence of opinion is the standard de-
viation of analyst forecasts (Diether et al. 2002, Boehme et al. 2005), but the standard devia-
tion of returns and the turnover ratio have also been employed (Boehme et al. 2005).  
Some researchers identify overvalued stocks by analyzing valuation ratios (Dechow et 
al. 2001, Desai et al. 2002, Jones and Lamont 2002) or by considering adjustments to analysts' 
earnings forecasts (Francis et al. 2005). The most widespread approach is to rely on subsequent 
returns to identify overvalued stocks. This approach is based on the implicit assumption that 
either short sale constraints are removed or the divergence of opinion is reduced (e.g. because 
new information is released), leading to a decrease of the level of overvaluation. Negative re-
turns are thus taken as evidence of initial overvaluation.  
Given the measurement problems and the different approaches to resolve them, it is not 
surprising that the conclusions are not entirely unanimous. A majority of papers find results 
that are supportive of the overvaluation hypotheses (e.g. Figlewski and Webb 1993, Danielsen 
and Sorescu 2001, Dechow et al. 2001, Desai et al. 2002, Diether et al. 2002, Jones and La-
mont 2002, Gopalan 2003, Ofek et al. 2004, Boehme et al. 2005, Cohen et al. 2005 and Nagel 
2005). Additional evidence in favor of the overvaluation hypothesis is provided by Aitken et 
al. (1998) and Chang and Yu (2004). Aitken et al. (1998) make use of the fact that in Australia 
short sales are transparent. Using intraday event study methodology they find that prices al-
most instantaneously decrease after a short sale. Chang and Yu (2004) use data from Hong 
Kong, where only stocks that are included on a short sale list can be shorted. The list is revised 
from time to time. Additions to and deletions from the list are associated with abnormal returns 
the sign of which is consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis.  
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Other papers support the overvaluation hypothesis only partially, e.g. when equally-
weighted portfolios are considered (Asquith et al. 2005). Diether et al. (2005) find that returns 
of small stocks are negative after a period of increased short selling (which is consistent with 
the overvaluation hypothesis) but that returns after inclusion of small firms in the threshold list 
are, if anything, negative. The latter result is inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis 
because inclusion in the threshold list implies more binding short sale restrictions. Brent et al. 
(1990) report that returns are not smaller in the month after an increase in short interest, which 
is also inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis. Mayhew and Mihov (2004) present evi-
dence suggesting that the negative returns around option listing that have been documented by 
others are not robust. They conclude by stating (p. 22) that "we now believe that there is no 
credible evidence from option markets that a marginal change in the cost of short selling can 
have an impact on prices." 
Both Bris et al. (2004) and Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) compare stock return char-
acteristics in countries with and without short sale restrictions. Both papers conclude that al-
lowing short sales increases the efficiency of price discovery. Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) 
find that when countries start to allow short selling aggregate stock returns increase. This is 
clearly inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis.
4  
In summary, even though a majority of empirical papers finds results supportive of the 
overvaluation hypothesis, it appears fair to conclude that the issue is not yet finally settled. The 
measurement issues alluded to above suggest that an experimental approach may be warranted.  
                                                 
4  Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) attribute their result to increased liquidity which, in turn, lowers expected 
returns and thus leads to an increase in stock prices.  
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Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) report results of experimental asset markets 
without short selling in which a long-lived asset is traded. They find that persistent bubbles 
occur very frequently. A number of subsequent papers have investigated into the reasons why 
these bubbles occur. Three of these papers (King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy 
and Noussair 2005) test whether lifting short sale restrictions reduces the frequency and / or 
the magnitude of the bubbles. The results are mixed. King et al. (1993) find that a relaxation of 
the short sale constraints does not have much impact on the occurrence of bubbles. Ackert et 
al. (2002), on the other hand, find prices closer to the fundamental value of the asset when 
short sale restrictions are relaxed. Haruvy and Noussair (2005) use a more differentiated ex-
perimental design and find that removing short sale restrictions reduces prices, but does not 
necessarily make them more efficient. In fact, when short sales are allowed prices may be sig-
nificantly below the fundamental value.  
Our experimental design differs in a number of important respects from former experi-
ments. Most importantly, in all previous experiments subjects had symmetric information. Di-
vergence of opinion can thus not be traced back to different information on the asset value.
5 
Obviously, the degree of divergence of opinion can not be varied in a symmetric information 
setting. Another important difference is that all previous experiments used a long lived asset 
with a fundamental value that declined in the course of the experiment. Endowments were not 
re-initialized. Consequently, a subject exhausting her short selling capacity in one period is 
unable to sell in the next period. In contrast, our experiments consist of stationary replications 
of a one-period economy.  
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3  Experimental Design and Procedures 
We conduct 18 experimental sessions in which a total of 180 subjects participate.
6 Par-
ticipants are recruited among economics students at the university of Bonn using the online 
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Ten subjects are assigned to one cohort. Each cohort 
participates in one experimental session that consists of three distinct parts. . In order to allow 
the subjects to get acquainted with the computerized trading system, the sessions start with 
three training periods that are not included in the analysis. Subsequently there are 20 trading 
periods. In 10 of these periods short selling is prohibited and in ten periods it is allowed. We 
thus choose a within-subjects design, i.e. each cohort faces both the short selling condition and 
the no short-selling condition. To control for order effects half of the cohorts encounter the 
short selling condition first and the other half face the no short selling condition first.  
Subjects receive a 20 € show-up fee for participation. In addition, at the end of the ses-
sion two periods (one period of the no short selling condition and one period of the short sell-
ing condition) are determined randomly. The profit of these periods is converted into Euros at 
a rate of 20 ECU
7 = 1 € and added to (or subtracted from) the show-up fee.  
                                                                                                                                                          
5  There may, however, be differences of opinion due to strategic uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty with respect to the 
behaviour of other subjects.  
6  Four sessions are conducted with experienced subjects. We thus have 100 subjects who participate in one 
session and 40 subjects who participate in two sessions. Double-counting the latter group yields the number of 
180 participants.  
7  In the experiment all prices are denoted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU).  
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Asset value and private signals 
Subjects in the experiment trade a risky asset against a numéraire (cash, denoted Ex-
perimental Currency Units, ECU). The value of the asset is a random variable denoted V % . The 
value is high (H) or low (L) with equal probabilities. The realization is determined randomly at 
the beginning of each period but is only revealed after the end of the period. Draws in different 
periods are independent of each other.  
At the beginning of the period each subject receives a private signal s that provides in-
formation on the value of the asset. The signal is either h (indicating a high value) or l (indicat-
ing a low value). The signal has precision p where p is the probability that the signal is correct, 
i.e.,  
( ) ( ) Prob Prob p hH lL ==  
The signal is uninformative if p = 0.5, it is informative but noisy if 0.5 < p < 1 and it is 
perfectly accurate if p = 1. The conditional expectation of the asset value is  
() ( ) ( )
() () ( )
1
1
E Vs h p H pL L pH L
E Vs l p L pH H pH L
== + − = + −




Divergence of opinion 
We wish to test the hypothesis that the overvaluation implied by the existence of short 
sale constraints increases in the degree of divergence of opinion among traders. We therefore 
vary the degree of divergence of opinion across (but not within) cohorts.  
A reasonable measure for the degree of divergence of opinion is the cross-sectional 
variance of the conditional expected value of the asset. If the asset value is high (H), on aver-
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age a fraction p of the traders receives the signal h and a fraction (1 - p) receives the signal l. 
The mean of the conditional expectations then is  
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The cross-sectional variance of the conditional expected value of the asset then is  
() () ( ) () { }








Var E V s V H p L p H L H p p H L
pH p H L H p p H L
pp pp H L
⎡⎤ == + −−− − − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
+− − − − − − − ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
=− − + −
%%
 
The corresponding values for the case of a low asset value are  
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Thus, irrespective of the realization of the asset value,
8 the cross-sectional variance of 
the conditional expectations of the asset value is proportional to  ( )()
2 14 4 1 pp pp θ ≡ −− + . 
Therefore, we use θ  to measure the degree of divergence of opinion. θ  is zero when p = 0.5., 
because in this case the signals are uninformative and the conditional expectations of the asset 
value are equal to the unconditional expectation. θ  increases when the signal becomes infor-
mative. θ  approaches zero when the signal precision p goes to one. This is the case because 
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the number of traders who receive a wrong signal goes to zero when p approaches 1. There 
exists a signal precision p that maximizes the degree of divergence of opinion. This maximum 
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Figure 1: Divergence measure θ against the signal precision p 
Parameter choice 
We choose the following parameters: H is set equal to 200 and L is set equal to 100. To 
vary divergence of opinion, we choose two different signal precisions. In some sessions p 
equals 0.6 and in other sessions p is equal to 0.8. The two treatments are characterized by very 
different degrees of divergence of opinion. Table 1 shows the expectation of the asset value 
conditional on the realization of the signal and its precision. It further presents the expected 
number of traders with correct and incorrect signals and the measure θ for the degree of diver-
gence of opinion.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                                                                                                                          
8  This is an implication of our assumption that the asset value is equally likely to be high or low.  
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Previous experimental studies featuring a long-lived asset (e.g. Smith et al. 1988, King 
et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 2005) have documented that without 
short selling possibility, overvaluation may even arise in the absence of asymmetric informa-
tion. It is not clear that this result extends to our design because we analyze static repetitions of 
a one-period economy rather than a long-lived asset. Still, in order to test whether the same 
effect arises in our experiments, we conduct two sessions with symmetric information. In these 
sessions, subjects do not receive private signals. We use the results of these sessions as a 
benchmark to measure the impact of divergence of opinion.  
Endowments and short selling restrictions 
Subjects in each session are randomly and independently subdivided into two endow-
ment groups at the beginning of each period. The different endowments create a rational mo-
tive for trade among subjects. Half of the subjects are endowed with four assets and 150 ECU 
(denoted the share endowment group). The remaining subjects are endowed with one asset and 
600 ECU (denoted the cash endowment group). The (unconditional) expected values of the 
endowments are equal.  
Subjects of both endowment groups have unlimited access to credit at a zero interest 
rate. Therefore, a situation where a subject would like to buy assets but is unable to do so can 
not arise.  
In the no short selling treatment short sales are prohibited. The trading system rejects 
any offer that, if executed, would result in a short position. In the short selling treatment, on the 
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other hand, short sales are allowed without any limitations and costs (e.g., lending fees).
9 Short 
positions are covered at the end of the trading period. For each share shorted, an amount equal 
to the true value of the asset is deducted from the subject's cash balance.  
At the end of each period, the terminal wealth of each subject is calculated by adding 
the end-of-period cash balance and the value of the share portfolio (the product of the number 
of shares and their fundamental value). The profit is then calculated as the difference between 
the end-of-period wealth and the value of the endowment.
10  
Market structure 
The market is a computerized continuous auction market with an open limit order book. 
We use the software zTree (Fischbacher 1999) to implement the trading system at the Univer-
sity of Bonn Experimental Economics Laboratory (BonnEconLab). 
Each trading period lasts 150 seconds. At the beginning of each trading period the limit 
order book is empty. Traders can submit limit orders or accept standing limit orders submitted 
by others. Order execution is governed by price and time priority. Order size is restricted to 
one share. The minimum tick size is set to one ECU which amounts to 0.67% of the uncondi-
tional expected value of the asset. 
Trading is anonymous; subject identification codes are thus not visible on the screen. 
There is full post-trade transparency, i.e., transaction prices (but not the identity of the traders) 
                                                 
9  This implies that shorting supply is infinite. Alternatively, we could allow short selling but restrict the amount 
of shares that can be shorted, or we could introduce short selling costs. Results in Cohen et al. (2005) suggest that 
it is shorting demand, rather than supply, that causes valuation effects. We therefore decided to (implicitly) vary 
the shorting demand by imposing different degrees of divergence of opinion, but to keep shorting supply constant.  
10  The share endowment is valued at the fundamental value of the shares. Thus, a subject who does not trade has 
a profit of zero irrespective of the realization of the asset value.  
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are visible to all traders. Subjects are not able to identify whether a trade they observe results 
in a short position.  
Implementation issues  
If the realizations of the signals were determined entirely randomly we would face two 
(related) problems. First, since the number of traders with correct and incorrect signals is de-
termined randomly and thus changes, the effective degree of divergence of opinion may differ 
from the value shown in Table 1 and also changes across periods. Second, it may happen (par-
ticularly in the p = 0.8 treatment) that no trader obtains a wrong signal. In that case, however, 
there would be no informational asymmetry (although subjects would not be aware of that 
fact).  
In order to avoid these problems, we choose a modified procedure by fixing the number 
of correct and incorrect signals at their expected values In the p = 0.6 [0.8] treatments, always 
six [eight] traders receive a correct signal and four [two] traders get an incorrect signal. Also, 
symmetry across the two endowment groups is imposed. Thus, in both endowment groups of 
the p = 0.6 [0.8] treatment there are three [four] traders with a correct signal and two traders 
[one trader] with an incorrect signal.  
This procedure has the advantage that, from the point of view of the individual subject, 
signals are still determined randomly with known precision p = 0.6 [0.8] while at the same time 
the value of θ  is held constant.  
It may be the case that, with experience, subjects learn to avoid overvaluation. In prin-
ciple this issue can be addressed by comparing misvaluation across periods and by comparing 
the results of those treatments where the sequence of short-selling and no short-selling is re-
versed. However, the 20 periods of an individual experiment may not be sufficient for learning 
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to occur. In order to account for this possibility, we additionally conduct four sessions with 
experienced subjects, i.e., subjects that have already participated in a previous experimental 
session.  
Treatment summary  
Table 2 summarizes the treatments and introduces the notation that will be used in the 
sequel. "E" denotes a session with experienced subjects. All experiments were conducted in 
October and November 2005 in the BonnEconLab.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
4  Hypotheses 
Binding short sale constraints prevent traders who are willing to sell from doing so and 
will thus lead to a lower trading volume. We thus state  
Hypothesis 1: Trading volume 
H1: Trading volume is lower under short-sale constraints 
In the benchmark treatment (AP0 and PA0) traders only receive information about the 
unconditional expected value of the asset. We should thus expect prices to be equal to or (be-
cause of risk aversion) lower than 150. According to the overvaluation hypothesis both short 
sale constraints and divergence of opinion are necessary conditions for overvaluation to occur 
(for empirical evidence see Boehme et al. 2005). As there is no divergence of opinion in the 
benchmark treatment we do not expect short sale restrictions to affect valuation. We thus ex-
pect  
Hypothesis 2: The benchmark treatment 
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H2a: In the benchmark treatment prices are equal to or (because of risk aversion) 
slightly lower than 150.  
H2b: In the benchmark treatment there are no differences between the short-selling and 
the no short-selling conditions.  
In those treatments with informational asymmetries (PA60, AP60, PA80 and AP80) there is 
divergence of opinion. The overvaluation hypothesis thus predicts that prices will be higher 
when short selling is prohibited. This yields  
Hypothesis 3: Short selling 
H3: In the presence of asymmetric information prices are higher when short selling is 
prohibited.  
The overvaluation hypothesis predicts that prices are increasing in the degree of divergence of 
opinion. In the experiment we vary the degree of divergence of opinion yielding  
Hypothesis 4: Divergence of opinion:  
H4: The overvaluation due to short sale constraints is more pronounced when the de-
gree of divergence of opinion is higher.  
As noted previously the overvaluation hypothesis in its original form is inconsistent with a 
rational expectations equilibrium. A similar statement can be made for our experimental de-
sign. If all subjects behave rationally there will be no overvaluation. Even if subjects are not 
fully rational, they may learn and thus achieve outcomes closer to a rational expectations equi-
librium in later periods. If learning occurs we should also expect overvaluation to be less pro-
nounced in those sessions that use experienced subjects. This leads to 
Hypothesis 5: Learning 
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H5a: The amount of overvaluation decreases over periods  
H5b: The amount of overvaluation is smaller in the sessions that use experienced sub-
jects.  
5  Results 
Table 3 reports figures on trading volume. The sessions for each treatment (PA0, AP0, 
PA60, AP60, PA80 and AP80) are pooled, and the mean and the median trading volume per 
period is calculated for the short-selling and the no-short-selling condition. Besides separate 
results for each treatment the table also contains (in the last line) the results pooled over all 
treatments. These aggregate results clearly confirm Hypothesis 1. Both the mean and the me-
dian trading volume are higher when short sales are allowed. The disaggregated data reveal a 
similar picture, though with exceptions. Trading volume is significantly higher when short 
sales are allowed in three out of six treatments. In the PA80 treatment the mean is significantly 
higher whereas there is no significant difference in the median. In the remaining two treat-
ments (PA0 and PA60), there is no significant difference in trading volume. In summary, the 
results indicate that trading volume tends to be higher when short-selling is allowed.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
The hypotheses 2 - 5 make predictions about the asset prices in different treatment con-
ditions. A test of these hypotheses requires a summary statistic of the asset prices. We use 
three such measures. The first is simply the mean price for each period. This measure assigns 
equal weight to each transaction within a given period. As the prices early in a period are less 
informative it may be preferable to use a weighting scheme that puts more weight on transac-
17 
 
tions occurring later in a period. We therefore use a digitally weighted average price as our 



















were  j T  is the number of transactions in period j and  i p  is the price of transaction i in 
period  j. If there are five transactions in a period, the first one receives weight 
() 1 12345 1 1 5 ++++ = , the second receives weight 21 5 and so on. Our third measure is the 
mean of the bid-ask midpoints. The midpoint is not affected by the bid-ask spread and is there-
fore often considered to be a less noisy measure of asset value.  
Hypothesis 2 relates to the benchmark treatment and predicts that prices in the bench-
mark treatment will be equal to or smaller than 150 (the unconditional expected value of the 
asset), and that, because of the absence of divergence of opinion, prices will not be higher 
when short selling is prohibited. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the three price measures 
described above. We treat the observations from different periods as independent.
11 We pro-
vide aggregate results and separate results for the PA and the AP treatments because the se-
quence in which subjects face the two conditions may have an impact on market outcomes.  
                                                 
11  This is a common practice. It should be noted, though, that data from different periods of the same session are 




In the benchmark treatment we do not have to differentiate with respect to the realiza-
tion of the asset value because subjects do not receive information about the value and, conse-
quently, can not condition their actions on the asset value.  
The results are shown in Table 4. Panel A shows the results for the equally weighted 
mean price, Panel B those based on the digitally weighted mean and Panel C those based on 
the bid-ask midpoint. All three measures yield very similar conclusions. The only noteworthy 
difference is the fact that significance levels tend to be higher when the analysis is based on 
bid-ask midpoint. This corroborates our conjecture that the midpoint is a less noisy measure of 
asset value.  
All three measures clearly indicate that prices for the benchmark treatments are signifi-
cantly below 150 as shown in the first line of Table 4. We therefore conclude that our experi-
mental design does not produce the "bubbles" that provided the starting point of previous ex-
periments on short sales (King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 2005).  
Prices are, however, significantly higher when short sales are prohibited (132.55 as 
compared to 127.96 with a t-statistic of 1.87, these figures are taken from Panel A). The disag-
gregated data show that this is mainly due to a large difference in the PA treatment (128.10 
when short sales are prohibited and 120.04 when they are feasible, t-statistic 3.40) whereas the 
difference in the AP treatment is insignificant. The other two measures of asset value yield 
identical conclusions. The results thus suggest that prices tend to be higher when short selling 
is prohibited even in the absence of divergence of opinion. This contradicts Hypothesis 2b.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
In all non-benchmark treatments subjects receive signals about the value of the asset. 
We should therefore expect prices to depend on the realization of the asset value process. Con-
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sequently, the results are presented conditional on the asset value being low (100) or high 
(200), as shown in Table 4. In almost all cases prices are higher when short sales are prohib-
ited. There are only two exceptions from this general pattern (in the AP60 treatment and in the 
PA80 treatment, respectively, when the value is high
12).  
Although the sign of the price difference generally conforms to our expectations the 
significance of the results is modest. Only three (Panel A) or four (Panels B and C) out of 
twelve t-statistics indicate significance at the 5% level (one-sided test). Taken together, these 
results do provide weak support for our Hypothesis 3. They also suggest that, in contrast to 
Hypothesis 4, the impact of short-selling restrictions on prices is not increasing in the degree of 
divergence of opinion. A more formal test of Hypothesis 4 will be presented later. 
Table 5 addresses the learning hypothesis. Since the three price measures yield very 
similar conclusions we restrict the presentation to the equally weighted mean price. In Panel A 
of Table 5 we report separate results for the first half (periods 1-5) and the second half (periods 
6-10) of each treatment condition. The results do not support the hypothesis that the impact of 
short selling restrictions on prices decreases with experience. Both in the first half and in the 
second half prices are higher when short sales are restricted in 6 out of a total of 10 cases. The 
most severe overvaluation is observed in the second half of the PA60 treatment when the true 
asset value is low. The average price is 174.93 when short sales are prohibited and 142.74 
when they are allowed. Panel B of Table 5 compares the results from the sessions with inexpe-
rienced and experienced subjects. Again, there is not much evidence that the impact of short 
selling restrictions on prices decreases with experience. For both groups, prices are higher 
                                                 
12  In Panel C there is a third exception in the "all" column for p=0.8 and a high asset value.  
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when short selling is prohibited in six out of eight cases. The results in Table 5 thus suggest 
that the (weak) support for the overvaluation hypothesis documented earlier is not attributable 
to inexperienced subjects.  
So far we have solely compared prices obtained under different treatment conditions. 
To obtain a more complete picture of the relation between short sale constraints and asset 
valuation we augment these univariate statistics with a pooled regression model. The depend-
ent variable is the (equally weighted) average price
13 in each of 20 periods
14 of the 18 sessions. 
The price is likely to depend on the treatment and on the realization of the asset value process. 
For example, when p = 0.8 subjects have more precise information as compared to the case 
where p = 0.6. We should thus expect higher prices in the p = 0.8 treatments when the true 
value is high and lower prices when the true value is low. To capture these effects we include 
dummy variables for each treatment (except AP0 which is the base case) and interaction terms, 
defined as the product of the treatment dummies and a dummy variable that equals one when 
the realized asset value is high.  
Besides these control variables we include a dummy variable that equals one when 
short selling is prohibited (model 1). The overvaluation hypothesis predicts a positive coeffi-
cient. In an additional model (model 2) we further add two interaction terms that interact the 
no-short-sales dummy with two dummy variables taking on the value one when p = 0.6 and p = 
0.8, respectively. The coefficients on these interaction terms measure whether the overvalua-
                                                 
13  Using the digitally weighted average price or the bid-ask midpoint instead yields similar conclusions.  
14  In period 14 of one session (PA60E) no transaction took place. The total number of observations in the regres-
sion is thus 359.   
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tion is more pronounced when the degree of divergence of opinion increases. The overvalua-
tion hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient.  
The results are presented in Table 6. The adjusted R
2 for both models is 0.5. The con-
trol and treatment variables thus explain about half of the variation in prices. Many of the 
treatment dummies and the interactions of the treatment dummies with the asset value dummy 
are significant, and most of the coefficients have the expected sign. Most importantly, prices 
are significantly higher when short sales are prohibited. The coefficient on the no-short-sales 
dummy is 4.51 (t-statistic 2.28) in model one and 4.14 (t-statistic 3.03) in model 2. These re-
sults are consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
The coefficients on the additional interaction terms in model 2 are far from being sig-
nificant. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 4 (but consistent with our previous results), overvalua-
tion does not increase in the degree of divergence of opinion.  
6  Summary and conclusion 
The overvaluation hypothesis first put forward by Miller (1977) predicts that assets will 
be overvalued when (a) short sale constraints and (b) differences of opinion exist. Numerous 
empirical studies have been conducted in order to test the overvaluation hypothesis. The results 
of these studies are not fully conclusive, partially due to measurement problems. Neither the 
existence (and degree, respectively) of short selling constraints nor the degree of divergence of 
opinion and the true value of a stock is observable, directly. 
To avoid the shortcomings of previous empirical studies, we use an experimental ap-
proach. In the laboratory, trading of assets can be observed under ceteris paribus conditions 
with and without short selling constraints. We can thus examine the impact of short selling 
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constraints on valuation. Our design further allows varying the degree of divergence of opinion 
across markets. 
The results are only partially supportive of the overvaluation hypothesis. We find evi-
dence of higher asset values in the presence of short sale constraints. We do not find, however, 
that overvaluation is increasing in the degree of divergence of opinion. We further document 
that trading volume is lower under short sale constraints, and that the overvaluation does not 
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Table 1: Parameter choice 
The table shows the parameters used in the individual experimental treatments. It further shows the expected 
value of the asset conditional on the signal and the expected number of traders with a correct and an incorrect 
signal. The full information benchmark is the expected value of the asset conditional on all 10 signals and under 
the assumption that the numbers of correct and incorrect signals are equal to their expected values. The last line 
shows the measure of divergence of opinion, θ.  
 
  p = 0 (benchmark)  p = 0.6  p = 0.8 
  asset value  asset value  asset value 
  high  low high low high low 
asset  value  200  100 200 100 200 100 
cond. expectation of 
trader with signal h  na  na  160 160 180 180 
expected number of 
traders with signal h  na  na  6 4 8 2 
cond. expectation of 
trader with signal l  na  na  140 140 120 120 
expected number of 
traders with signal l  na  na  4 6 2 8 
full information bench-
mark  150  150  169.23 130.77 199.98 100.02 
measure of divergence of 




Table 2: Treatment summary 
The table describes the treatments and shows the number of sessions that were conducted with each treatment 
condition.  
 
  sequence of treatments 
Signal precision  short selling prohibited - short sell-
ing allowed (PA) 
short selling allowed - short selling 
prohibited (AP) 
no signals (benchmark case)  PA0 - session 1  AP0 session 10 
p = 0.6  PA60 - sessions 2-4 
PA60E - session 5 
AP60 sessions 11-13 
AP60E - session 14 
p = 0.8  PA80 - sessions 6-8 
PA80E - session 9 
AP80 sessions 15-17 




Table 3: Trading volume 
The table shows the mean and the median trading volume per period for the different treatment conditions. Col-
umns 5 and 8 report the t-statistic and the z-statistic for a test of the null hypothesis of equal means and medians, 
respectively. The last line shows results pooled over all treatment conditions.  
 
 
















P-A  27.10  33.30  1.19   26.50  33.50  1.14   Bench-
mark  A-P  10.60  8.00  2.29   11.00  8.00  1.99  
P-A  13.73  14.78  0.44   13.50  9.50  0.80  
p = 0.6 
A-P  27.85  13.25  5.03   26.50  12.00  4.88  
P-A  14.63  11.80  1.75   13.50  12.00  1.22  
p = 0.8 
A-P  23.60  9.63  4.24   16.50  8.00  3.97  






Table 4: Price Levels 
The table shows the mean price per period for the different treatment conditions. We report separate results for 
periods with low and high asset values, respectively (no such distinction is made in the benchmark treatment 
because there traders did not receive signals about the asset value). Columns 3-5 (6-8) report the prices for those 
periods where short sales were allowed (prohibited). We provide separate results for those sessions were the order 
of treatments was P-A and A-P, respectively, as well as aggregated results. Columns 9-11 show the t-statistics for 
the null hypothesis of equal means. The t-statistic in column 9 (10; 11) relate to a comparison of the prices in 
columns 3 and 6 (4 and 7; 5 and 8).  
 
Panel A: Mean price, equally weighted 





P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all 
Benchmark  120.04 135.88 127.96 128.10 136.99 132.55  3.40  0.95  1.87 
100  144.11 141.41 142.76 153.75 147.95 150.33  1.71  1.52  2.20 
p = 0.6 
200  156.11 148.69 152.30 157.09 147.42 153.08  0.21  0.23  0.21 
100  122.77 127.36 124.70 138.60 130.51 134.32  1.77  0.31  1.44 
p = 0.8 
200  184.79 168.74 175.95 181.50 175.07 178.42  0.63  0.96  0.56 
 
Panel B: Mean price, digitally weighted 





P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all 
Benchmark  119.84 136.18 128.01 127.94 136.91 132.43  3.14  0.60  1.73 
100  143.69 139.33 141.51 154.39 148.31 150.80  1.79  2.00  2.55 
p = 0.6 
200  155.38 148.77 151.98 157.01 147.79 153.19  0.33  0.16  0.31 
100  120.16 125.89 122.57 137.52 129.89 133.48  1.78  0.38  1.55 
p = 0.8 
200  187.30 169.91 177.72 184.78 176.23 180.69  0.49  0.94  0.67 
 
Panel A: Bid-ask midpoint 





P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all P-A  A-P all 
Benchmark  118.71 135.46 127.08 132.96 137.35 135.16  6.37  1.40  3.42 
100  141.92 144.13 143.03 153.22 147.88 150.07  2.23  1.12  2.40 
p = 0.6 
200  154.70 149.48 152.09 156.40 149.16 153.40  0.38  0.08  0.43 
100  118.97 128.54 122.98 134.50 134.57 134.54  2.16  0.81  2.25 
p = 0.8 




Table 5: Learning 
Panel A shows average prices for the first half (periods 1-5) and the second half (periods 6-10) of the different 
treatment conditions. Results are differentiated with respect to the degree of divergence of opinion (p = 0.6 and p 
= 0.8), the realization of the asset value process (with the exception of the benchmark case), the order of treat-
ments (P-A and A-P) and the short selling condition (allowed and prohibited). Panel B compares the results from 
the sessions with inexperienced and experienced subjects. There are no results for the benchmark treatment be-
cause there was no session with the benchmark treatment and experienced subjects. The structure of Panel B is 
similar to Panel A.  
 
Panel A: First half versus second half 
 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited 






1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
benchmark  124.88 115.19 137.12 134.63 127.46 128.74 136.87 137.12 
100  146.09 142.74 144.28 139.02 144.13 174.93 147.80 148.10 
p = 0.6 
200  154.68 158.15 142.99 155.82 155.85 157.84 143.51 150.89 
100  126.35 118.30 127.72 126.94 146.24 130.96 123.60 144.33 
p = 0.8 
200  185.01 184.61 156.83 179.81 181.69 181.31 172.73 176.40 
 
 
Panel B: Inexperienced versus experienced subjects  
 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited 






inexp. exp. inexp. exp. inexp. exp. inexp. exp. 
100  145.35 141.92 139.61 147.57 154.65 147.50 143.39 158.36 
p = 0.6 
200  156.18 155.00 144.74 158.97 158.63 154.01 144.85 159.41 
100  116.51 144.70 134.17 104.65 149.00 125.23 134.08 117.99 
p = 0.8 





Table 6: Regression results 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the average price of each period. We 
include control variables for the different treatment conditions and interactions between these control variables 
and a dummy that is equal to 1 whenever the asset value is high. In model 1 we include a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when short selling is prohibited. In model 2 we further include interactions between the short selling 
dummy and dummy variables that equal 1 in those sessions where p = 0.6 and p = 0.8 (denoted div 60 and div 
80), respectively. The number of observations is 359 (18 sessions, each with 20 periods; in one period no transac-
tion took place). t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
 Model  1  Model2 
  coefficient t-value coefficient t-value 
constant 134.84  70.90  135.09  79.79 
AP60  4.41 1.63 4.30 1.44 
AP80  -3.36 -0.54 -3.83 -0.58 
AP60E  16.39 3.77 16.31 3.40 
AP80E  -25.15 -7.33 -25.61 -6.31 
PA0  -10.76 -5.67 -10.80 -5.75 
PA60  12.90 3.43 12.80 3.30 
PA80  -7.39 -1.49 -7.78 -1.45 
PA60E  7.29 1.60 7.10 1.53 
PA80E  -5.41 -0.54 -5.90 -0.54 
Value200  -1.21 -0.76 -1.32 -0.88 
AP60*Value200  4.42 1.07 4.54 1.11 
AP80*Value200  43.12 5.79 43.29 5.80 
AP60E*Value200  7.42 1.07 7.47 1.07 
AP80E*Value200  50.43 8.53 50.58 8.71 
PA0*Value200  -3.83 -1.42 -3.76 -1.41 
PA60*Value200  8.62 1.85 8.73 1.90 
PA80*Value200  54.54 9.76 54.58 9.81 
PA60E*Value200  9.18 1.31 9.50 1.37 
PA80E*Value200  52.23 3.76 52.46 3.75 
no short sales  4.51  2.28  4.14  3.03 
no short 
sales*div60 
   0.07  0.03 
no short 
sales*div80 
   0.75  0.19 
adj. R
2 0.50  0.50 
 
 
33